

## Freedom of Information Request FOI 24 05

## Various Questions on the SSE Renewables SSS BESS

## Query and Response:

Q F1 There is no evidence in the WCC application papers online that D&WF&RS were consultees in autumn 2019 – can this be confirmed?

We can confirm there is no record of contact at pre or planning stage in relation to this site.

Q F2 When did first D&W F&RS contact with the applicants for the SSS BESS occur?

Our records indicate that the first contact from SSE was on the 11<sup>th</sup> October 2021.

Q F3 Is it possible to have a summary of details of what has subsequently been agreed?

Since planning had already been determined so DWFRS were unable to significantly influence the design, however recommendations to be considered were shared which included DWFRS guidance note and the NFCC Grid Scale Battery Energy Storage System Guidance. It was agreed that:

- recommendations would be included as far as reasonably practicable.
- Emergency Response Plans to be drafted and a familiarisation visit to be carried out by local crew.

Q F 4 Have the SSS safety plans now been signed off by D&W F&RS? **DWFRS do not sign off or provide a compliance assurance process.** 

Q F 5 Are guidance issues covered in the final NFCC guidance (February 2023) taken on board and have plans as submitted in 2019 changed? This would address approval of the SSS BESS plans for:

- system design, construction, testing
- the battery type to be installed at SSS with evidence from the supplier/ installer of the Tesla containers/batteries of their safety. Are they the same battery format as involved in the document Tesla incidents (see above) or different? Has evidence been provided on how often the proposed battery units have been being shut down on existing operational sites, thereby avoiding fire/explosion?
- suppression systems within, and exterior to, battery containers
- a Battery Management System including overheating detection and 24/7 remote monitoring – and its successful operation over time on Tesla battery sites. The BMS at Carnegie Road was rendered inoperative very swiftly – what new arrangements will preclude this at SSS?)
- an Emergency Response Plan including protocols with the National Grid re cutting off electricity supply to and from the site, and each storage unit on site<sup>[1]</sup> and detailed work on plans with the D&W F&RS on emergency plans.
- agreement on an appropriate distance between battery units<sup>[2]</sup>

## CHANGING & SAVING LIVES



- multiple access routes for fire tenders to ensure access when wind is in an adverse direction- a southerly wind could preclude Fire services coming safely anywhere near the site.
- water hydrants near/ on site with supply at sufficient pressure if fire occurs
- an adequately sized filtration tank for fire-affected water run-off
- plume analysis of any fire from likely wind directions important with housing only 400 m away
- standards to be adopted were units to be decommissioned in the life-span of the BESS and at its closure
- F&RS modelling of time from alarm to suitable tender/s and equipment being likely to be on site

As DWFRS records are limited at the planning stage, we cannot yet confirm to what extent the guidance has been applied since the original plans were lodged. Requests for copies of any supporting documentation should be requested from the site management in the first instance. It should be noted that the FRS are not able to impose conditions or require alterations to the site design.

Q F6 Has D&W F&RS considered with WCC LPA the safety implications of the possibility of new developments immediately adjacent to the SSS site on the Quidhampton Quarry site– see Q W3 above

Any future planning application received for consultation would be assessed as appropriate.

Information/Detail accurate on the date provided: 31, January 2024

